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ESTABLISHING UNIFORMITY: THE NEED FOR A PER SE
RULE AGAINST THE GROUPING OF MONEY LAUNDERING
AND FRAUD COUNTS UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
The goal of the American criminal justice system is to achieve
justice and fairness for all involved, including the victim, the
accused, and society as a whole.1 Fundamental to this proposition,
however, is a system without gaps: from the arrest to the pun-
ishment, the system must consistently apply policies and
procedures that promote the ultimate goals of justice and fairness.
With a break in the chain, these goals cannot be realized. Thus, the
sentencing decision, as one necessary link in the chain, is critically
important to the criminal justice system. As one commentator has
stated:
The sentencing decision is the symbolic keystone of the
criminal justice system: in it, the conflicts between the goals of
equal justice under the law and individualized justice with
punishment tailored to the offender are played out, and society's
moral principles and highest values-life and liberty-are
interpreted and applied.2
Indeed, the sentencing decision is even more than a "symbolic
keystone"; the decision has real consequences, not only for the
1. It should be emphasized that this is thegoal ofthe American criminaljustice system.
Clearly, one can argue with the results of the system, as individuals and groups frequently
do. Victims' rights advocates argue that the system is unfair to victims; defense attorneys,
civil libertarians, and civil rights activists argue that the system is unfair to those accused
of crimes; and politicians of every political stripe argue, most frequently around election
time, that society is being misserved by the system. While some may argue that structural
remediation is necessary, the reality is that much ofthe criticism is born of self-interest (e.g.,
vote-hungry politicians) and, in cases where the system appears to fail, the perceived failure
is probably more often endemic of localized abuses (e.g.,jury nullification, prosecutorial and
police misconduct, etc.) than systemwide failure.
2. 1RESEARCHON SENTENCING:THE SEARCH FoRREFoIM 1 (AlfredBlumstein etal. eds.,
1983).
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accused, but also for the many other individuals directly and
indirectly affected by the crime.
Congress recognized the importance of sentencing when it passed
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.' Congress had become
disenchanted with the wide sentencing disparity in federal courts,
whereby similar crimes would garner substantially different
sentences depending on which judge made the sentencing decision.4
To remedy this problem, the Act mandated the creation of the
United States Sentencing Commission, whose duty was to develop
a uniform, determinant sentencing system to be applied by all
federal judges.' The result of the Commission's work was the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines,6 which provide a relatively
straightforward, quasimathematical approach to criminal
sentencing. 7Yet, despite the general clarity of the Guidelines, they
3. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat.
1837, 2017-34 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-68 (1994), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98
(1994)).
4. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1988). For a more complete discussion,
see infra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
5. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994).
6. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2 (West 1996).
7. At least one author considers the Guidelines to be an abysmal failure because of,
among several other reasons, their complexity. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERS
72(1996). Tonry also gives a scathing assessment of the Sentencing Commission, stating that
the Commission "failed ... badly in nearly every respect." Id, at 83. While Tonry makes
several interesting points, one might question the motive for his hostility. For example,
Tonry concedes that the Commission has succeeded in making sentences harsher, but
equates this success with "that of a doctor whose patient died despite a successful operation."
Id. at 72. When this statement is read against the backdrop of earlier assertions in Tonry's
book, it becomes clear that his disdain for the Guidelines is a reflection of his ideological
beliefs. Indeed, while Tonry proposes to move the debate over sentencing beyond partisan
politics and ideological conflicts, he makes no attempt to hide his displeasure with the just
deserts" theory of sentencing (which is arguably the theoretical foundation for the
Guidelines) and with "campaigning conservative politicians." Id. at 7.
"Just deserts" is a multifaceted theory premised on the eminently rational belief that
"[sleverity of punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong" and
that individuals convicted of similar crimes should receive similar sentences. Andrew von
Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Principle of Commensurate Deserts, in SENTENCING 243, 243
(Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981) (emphasis omitted). Citing a host of
philosophers, Tonry dismisses this theory by peddling his own ideology, most notably that
we live in a world where not "all citizens have equal opportunities for self-realization and
material advancement." TONRY, supra, at 15. Implicit in this statement, of course, is that
socioeconomic inequities, whether real or perceived, justify disparate sentences. Thus,
Tonry's gloomy assessment of the Guidelines may be largely a reflection of his ideological
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are not without their interpretive problems. Nowhere is this more
clearly demonstrated than with the sentencing of defendants
convicted of multiple counts of money laundering and fraud.
The problem arises out of ambiguous phrasing within section
3D1.2 of the Guidelines.' This particular section provides for the
"grouping" of closely related counts.9 According to the Guidelines,
closely related counts are those counts which involve "substantially
the same harm."0 The Guidelines provide four subsections with the
express purpose of defining "substantially the same harm.""
Nevertheless, courts have been unable to agree on the scope and
meaning of this phrase, especially with regard to whether money
laundering and fraud convictions should be grouped as related
counts.
The issue, at last count, has split ten Federal Courts ofAppeals.12
Thus, the purpose of this Note is twofold. First, this Note attempts
to define more clearly the meaning and scope of "substantially the
same harm" as that phrase relates to money laundering and fraud
beliefs, rather than of an objective, empirical analysis.
8. The section provides:
All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into
a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same harm within the
meaning of this rule:
(a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or
transaction.
(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or
transactions connected by a common criminal objective or
constituting part of a common scheme or plan.
(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a
specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline
applicable to another of the counts.
(d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the
total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or
some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is
ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written
to cover such behavior.
18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2.
9. See id.
l0. Id.
11. Id.
12. The First, Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the counts
should not be grouped. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. O'Kane, 155 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Hildebrand, 152
F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1998) and United
States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568,571 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522
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convictions. Second, the Note recommends the establishment of a
per se rule for the federal courts to follow: money laundering and
fraud should not, under any circumstances, be grouped as related
counts. Implementation of this rule will have the immediate effect
of resolving the circuit split and will best serve the intended
purposes of the Guidelines, namely uniformity and proportionality
in sentencing.13
Section I provides a more detailed explanation of the issue.
Section II examines the policies underlying the Sentencing
Guidelines, including an explanation of why the Guidelines initially
were implemented. Section III provides a brief survey of the circuit
split. Section IV is a detailed analysis of the relevant subsections of
section 3D1.2. This section integrates and expands upon material
from prior sections of the Note (i.e., policy considerations and the
cases) and argues that money laundering and fraud should not be
grouped. Finally, Section V recommends the establishment of a per
se rule against the grouping of money laundering and fraud
convictions. Such a rule would be applied as a matter of law,
rendering moot the underlying facts of the particular case with
regard to the grouping decision.1'
MONEY LAUNDERING AND FRAUD AS RELATED COUNTS
The issue is easily stated: whether money laundering and fraud"
should be grouped as related counts under section 3D1.2 of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. While some may consider the issue
(10th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298,302 (9th Cir. 1993). The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits have held that money laundering and fraud should be grouped as related
counts. See United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 167 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Wilson, 98 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560,1564 (11th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1186 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 314 (3d Cir. 1991).
13. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
14. This is only logical. To establish a per se rule, the sentencing court must not be left
with the discretion to group the counts under a particular set of facts.
15. "Fraud" can take many forms, such as wire fraud, mail fraud, and bank fraud. This
Note uses the term in its generic sense, which is "[a]n intentional perversion of truth for the
purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging
1080 [Vol. 42:1077
2001] ESTABLISHING UNIFORMITY 1081
nothing more than"a bit of sentencing esoterica," 6 the fact remains
that this is an important issue that will continue to spawn
inconsistent results in the federal judiciary until definitively
resolved.17 The decision whether to group the counts can, moreover,
dramatically impact the ultimate sentence that the defendant
receives. To understand this potentially dramatic impact, one must
first understand the procedure for determining total combined
offense levels in cases of multiple count convictions and the integral
role that the grouping decision plays in this determination.
Pursuant to section 3D1.1(a), there is a three-step procedure for
determining offense levels in cases of multiple count convictions."8
First, all counts should be separated into groups of closely related
counts by applying the rules specified in section 3D1.2. 9 Second,
the count with the highest offense level within each group of
convictions is used to determine that group's offense level pursuant
to section 3D1.3. 20 Third, if there is more than one group, a total
combined offense level must be calculated in accordance with the
rules set forth in section 3D1.4.2 Under this section, the group with
to him or to surrender a legal right." BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 660 (6th ed. 1990). This
generic definition is appropriate because, while the various fraud crimes are statutorily
distinct, the distinction rests only in the manner ormethod by which the crime is carried out.
The intent and harm of each crime is, at least in the abstract, identical. Likewise, "money
laundering" is a term that encompasses more than one particular crime. For example, the
federal money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57, contain provisions for eleven
different types of laundering activity. For the purposes of this Note, "money laundering" can
be defined generally as "the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or
illegal application of income, and disguises that income to make it appear legitimate." Jason
Schuck & Matthew E. Unterlack, Money Laundering, 33 AM. CRIM. L. Rzv. 881,881 (1996)
(citation omitted).
While the Note utilizes the generic definitions of these terms, this is not meant to suggest
that the specific statutes are not important in determining the appropriate sentence under
the Guidelines. Indeed, the Guidelines draw distinctions based on which statute is violated.
For example, the money laundering guideline provides for a higher base offense level if the
defendant is convicted under section 1956(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), or (a)(3)(A), but a lower level if
the conviction is under any of the other provisions. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 2S1.1.
Nevertheless, these considerations do not change the substantive analysis of section 3D1.2.
Where necessary to accurately illustrate a particular proposition, the Note will refer to
specific statutory provisions.
16. Paul C. Rauser, Split Widens in Circuits Over 'Grouping' Under Guidelines, 7 No. 4
MONEY LAUNDERENG L. REP. 1, 6 (1996).
17. See supra note 12.
18. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.l(a).
19. See id. § 3Dl.1(a)(1).
20. See id. § 3D1.1(a)(2).
21. See id. § 3DI.I(aX3).
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the highest offense level is assigned a value of one "Unit."' The
other groups are then assigned a certain number of "Units" based
on their level of seriousness in relation to the group with the
highest offense level.23 Finally, the Units are added together and
are used to increase the offense level of the group with the highest
offense level.24
Thus, as the critical first step, the grouping decision plays an
important role in the sentence ultimately handed down. The actual
effect of the grouping decision on the defendant's sentence,
however, is less clear. Intuitively, grouping would appear to benefit
the defendant by shortening the length of the sentence. This is not
always true, however: in some cases, the defendant's sentence will
actually be increased by grouping the counts.
This apparent anomaly is the subject of discussion in United
States v. Napoli.' The court cites the example of a defendant who
fraudulently obtains $1,000,000 from multiple victims but launders
only $100,000 of that money. 6 If the counts are not grouped, the
defendant's fraud count is assigned a total offense level of 19 based
on section 2F1.1,27 while the money laundering count is assigned a
total offense level of 20 based on section 2S1.1(a)(2). The total
22. See id. § 3D1.4(a).
23. See id. § 3D1.4.
24. See id. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that multiple counts of conviction will
always be "combined" under this section. In other words, "grouping" and "combining" are
distinct species under the Guidelines. Moreover, a "group" may be comprised of a single
count. See id. § 3D1.2, Commentary, Application Note 7. For a relevant example, consider
the case of a defendant who is convicted of two counts, one for fraud and one for money
laundering. If the two counts are not grouped, then there will be two separate one-count
groups. These one-count groups will then be "combined" under section 3D1.4 to produce the
combined offense level.
25. 179 F.3d 1, 12 (2d Cir. 1999).
26. See id.
27. See id. To understand how the fraud count is assigned a total offense level of 19, one
must refer to section 2F1.1, which is the guideline that applies to fraud convictions. Under
this guideline, the offense is initially assigned a base level of six; two levels are then added
because there was more than one victim. Finally, 11 levels are added because the loss was
more than $800,000 but less than $1,500,000. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 2F1.1.
28. See id. As noted above, the federal money laundering statute is found in two sections
of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57. See supra note 15. The specific section
under which the defendant was convicted is important in determining the proper offense
level because different guidelines apply to each section. Moreover, different base offense
levels apply depending on the subsection under which the defendant was convicted. Thus,
in order for section 2S1.1 to apply and for the base offense level to be 20, the example
1082
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combined offense level under section 3D1.4 is 22.29 Conversely, if
the counts are grouped under section 3D1.2(d), the offense level is
based on the aggregated quantity of the harm (i.e., $1,100,000) in
accordance with section 3D1.3(b). Pursuant to section 2S1.1, the
base offense level is 20; the base level is then increased by five
because the value of the harm exceeded $1,000,000, thereby
resulting in a total combined offense level of 25.0 Thus, in this
particular case, the defendant would benefit from a decision not to
group the counts.
The example cited above is indicative of the primary problem
created by the lack of clarity in section 3D1.2. The problem, quite
simply, is uncertainty. Neither the defendant nor the prosecutor
can accurately determine the probable sentence which ultimately
will be handed down by the trial judge. 1 Even in the circuits which
have considered this issue, the courts' opinions were generally more
fact-specific than precedent setting.32 Indeed, none of the Federal
Appeals Courts have established a per se rule either requiring or
disallowing the grouping of money laundering and fraud counts.
requires that two assumptions be made. First, assume that the defendant was convicted
under section 1956. Second, assume that the defendant was not convicted under section
1956(aX1)(A), (a)(2)(A), or (aX3XA). Based on these assumptions, the total offense level for
the money laundering count is 20; there is no increase because the value of the funds
laundered did not exceed $100,000. See 18 U.S.CA app. § 2S1.1.
29. The total combined offense level of 22 is determined by taking the offense level
applicable to the group with the highest offense level, which in this case is the money
laundering level of 20, and increasing that level by two. The two-level increase is a result of
the number of "units" assigned to the groups. In this case, the money laundering group has
the highest offense level and is therefore assigned one unit. The fraud group is one level less
serious than the money laundering group (i.e., a level of 19) and is therefore assigned one
unit. Based on the table in section 3D1.4, two units requires an increase of two levels. See
18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.4.
30. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 2S1.1.
31. This uncertainty presumably impacts the decision of whether to plea bargain, and,
in the event of plea negotiations, makes it difficult for both the prosecutor and the defense
attorney to determine a reasonable negotiating range. Although controversial, plea
bargaining is generally acknowledged to be an effective method for reducing judicial costs
and enhancing judicial efficiency. Guilty pleas account for approximately ninety percent of
the convictions in the federal system. See THOMAS W. HUTcmsON ET AL., FEDERAL
SENTENCING LAWAND PRACTICE 1325 n.1 (2000) (citing the U.S. Sentencing Commission's
1997 sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics). Inconsistent interpretations of section
3D1.2 could potentially undermine this process, lending further credence to the argument
that this issue must be definitively resolved.
32. See supra note 12.
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In sum, the issue is of substantial present and future
importance. Before proceeding with the discussion of the cases and
the analysis of section 3D1.2, it is necessary to briefly review the
background of the Sentencing Guidelines, including the underlying
policy rationale for their implementation.
BACKGROUND
Prior to the implementation of the Guidelines, prison sentences
in the federal system were imposed in two stages.33 The trial judge
would first determine the maximum period the offender would
spend in prison. 4 The United States Parole Commission would
then decide what portion of the term the offender would actually
serve." Widely disparate sentences for individuals who had
committed similar crimes resulted due to the considerable
discretion permitted at both stages of the sentencing process. 6 The
length of the sentence imposed by the trial court was essentially
nonreviewable on appeal.3 7 Congressional discontent with this
system grew to such a level that it was termed a "national
scandal."38
Congress eventually responded to the problem by passing the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA)."9 The SRA created the
United States Sentencing Commission 0 as an independent agency
33. See Karen Skrivseth, Abolishing Parole: Assuring Fairness and Certainty in
Sentencing, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 281, 282 (1979).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at284-94. The authornotes thatthe Parole Commission attemptedto mitigate
sentencing disparity by implementing guidelines in 1973. See id. at 289.
37. See Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon's
Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 493, 506-08 (1999). Under the Guidelines, sentences are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996).
38. See Edward M. Kennedy, Symposium on Sentencing, Part I:Introduction, 7 HoFsTRA
L.REV. 1, 1 (1978); see also UNITED STATES SENTENCINGCOMMISSION: UNPUBLISHED PUBLIC
HEARINGS 1986, at 3 (1988) (recording the opening remarks at the Public Hearing on Offense
Seriousness as made by Chairman William W. Wilkins, Jr., who believed that sentencing
disparity "undermines public confidence in our system, and... breeds disrespect for the rule
of law").
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994).
40. The Commission is composed of seven voting and two nonvoting members. See 18
U.S.C.A. app. § 1A (West 1996). The members of the Commission are selected by the
1084 [Vol. 42:1077
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in the judicial branch4 and charged it with the responsibility of
comprehensively reforming the sentencing process through the
development of guidelines.42 After extensive hearings, deliberation,
and consideration of public comment, the Guidelines went into
effect in November of 1987.'
Through the enactment of the SRA, Congress sought to achieve
three primary objectives." First, Congress desired "honesty in
sentencing."' Under the pre-Guidelines system, judges would
sentence the offender to a certain number of years, only to have the
Parole Commission release the offender early in many cases.46 As
a result of this practice, offenders would often serve only about one-
third of the sentence imposed by the court.47 The granting of parole,
however, was not inevitable: the decision was based upon a
subjective determination by the Parole Commission at a future
point in time. Such a system "sometimes fooled the judges,
sometimes disappointed the offender, and often misled the
public."48 Thus, to restore credibility to the system, the SRA
abolished parole.49 Under the present law, the offender must serve
President and confirmed by the Senate. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). Current United States
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer was among the initial commissioners. See TONRY,
supra note 7, at 84.
41. The Commission's standing as an independent agency within the judicial branch was
immediately challenged as an improper legislative delegation and violation ofthe separation
ofpowers inMistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The Supreme Court rejected the
challenge, holding that the SRA did not violate the separation of powers because the
judiciary is the branch of government that has traditionally been entrusted with substantive
sentencing decisions and judicial rulemaking. See id. at 390-97. The Court also upheld the
general constitutionality of the Guidelines in this case. See id. at 412. The Court's quick
response to the constitutional challenge was necessary considering that between the initial
implementation of the Guidelines and the decision in Mistretta, a period of 14 months, nearly
150 federal judges found the Guidelines to be unconstitutional and refused to follow them.
See Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in Perspective: A
Theoretical Background and Overview 1, 16, in THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Dean J. Champion ed., 1989).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 994.
43. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 1A2.
44. See id. § 1A3.
45. Id.
46. See Breyer, supra note 4, at 4.
47. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 1A3.
48. Breyer, supra note 4, at 4.
49. See id.
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the sentence imposed by the court, except for a legislatively defined
"good time" reduction.50
The second objective Congress sought to achieve was uniformity
in sentencing. 1 As evidenced by numerous statistical studies, the
lack of uniformity was a serious problem under the pre-Guidelines
system.52 For example, in the Second Circuit, sentences could range
from three years to twenty years for identical crimes.' Sentences
also varied depending upon the region in which the offender was
convicted.54 Such results were inconsistent with notions of fairness
and equity in a national criminal justice system. Certainly one
could hardly argue that an offender who commits a federal crime
in New York City should be treated more harshly or more leniently
than an offender who commits the identical crime in Atlanta. Thus,
the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines was necessary to
achieve uniformity throughout the federal system.
The final objective Congress sought to achieve was
"proportionality in sentencing through a system that impose[d] ...
different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity."5
Certainly not all crimes are exactly the same simply because they
violate the same statute.5 " Thus, penal sentences should be
50. "Good time" has been defined as a 'credit toward service of a sentence for satisfactory
behavior. " Deborah G. Wilson, The Impact of Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Community
Corrections and Privatization 165, 168-69, in THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Dean J. Champion ed., 1989) (quoting the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, 1987d; ch. 229 sec. 3624(b)). The "good time" provision allows
offenders who are not serving life sentences to accrue a maximum 54 day credit annually;,
if the maximum credit is earned each year, the sentence will be reduced by approximately
15 percent. See id. at 169. Credits are awarded for compliance with prison rules and
regulations and thus are intended primarily to motivate the offenders to abide by the rules.
See id at 168-69.
51. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 1A3.
52. See Breyer, supra note 4, at 4-5. Not everyone is convinced that the pre-Guidelines
system was plagued by unwarranted disparities. At least two commentators have attacked
both the methodology and conclusions of the studies. See KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES,
FEAROFJUDGING: SENTENCINGGUIDELINESINTHEFEDERALCOURTS 107-10 (1998). Stith and
Cabranes also reject the notion that uniform sentencing "ought to be the paramount objective
in criminal sentencing." Id. at 105.
53. See Breyer, supra note 4, at 5.
54. See id.
55. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 1A3.
56. For example, a phone scam that nets $1,000,000 and harms 5,000 victims is
substantially different than a phone scam that nets $1,000 and harms one victim. Even
though both scams constitute wire fraud, hence violating the same statute, they can hardly
1086 [Vol. 42:1077
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tailored, at least to some degree, to the particular facts of the
crime. Reconciling the second and third objectives, however, proved
a difficult task when developing the Guidelines. 7 Simply put, a
system of uniformity would have destroyed proportionality because
such a system fails to take into account the myriad of special
circumstances surrounding particular crimes.' Conversely, a
system that granted judges broad discretion to consider the various
circumstances of each crime would undermine uniformity because
judges would inevitably exercise their discretionary powers in
different ways.59 Ultimately, the Commission attempted to balance
these two objectives by establishing broad categories for each crime
and subcategorizing a list of relevant distinctions.60
The end result of the SRA was, of course, the Sentencing
Guidelines. Each section is relatively detailed and is supported by
official commentary. As with any statute, however, careful drafting
and detailed commentary cannot prevent disputes as to intended
meaning.6' This inevitable dispute over meaning has been
dramatically illustrated by the divergent approaches to whether
money laundering and fraud should be grouped as related counts.
Accordingly, the discussion turns to the cases in which the Federal
Courts of Appeals have considered this issue.
be termed equivalent crimes deserving of similar punishment. This difference in degree
should be distinguished from cases of sentencing disparity, in which identical crimes are
punished differently. An example of sentencing disparity would be different punishments for
two individuals who had defrauded substantially the same number of victims for roughly
equal amounts of money.
57. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § lA3.
68. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. The Commission noted that a"system tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle
of each case would quickly become unworkable." Id. Thus, the subcategories omit certain
distinctions that some may consider important. See id.
61. Faced with this reality, the Sentencing Commission should adopt the per se rule
proposed in this Note. Unlike present section 3D1.2, the per se rule could be easily drafted
to avoid any ambiguity. The rule would simply state: "money laundering and fraud counts
shall not be grouped under any circumstances." The words "shall not" are emphasized in
order to foreclose any argument that such a rule is discretionary, as would be the case if the
phraseology was "may not." For a complete discussion of the proposed per se rule, see infra
notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
2001] 1087
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A SURVEY OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Under section 3D1.2, "[a]ll counts involving substantially the
same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group."62 Counts
are considered to involve "substantially the same harm" if they
meet any one of four criteria set out as subsections in the
Guideline.63 Thus, the issue to be resolved in each of the cases was
whether money laundering and fraud came within the meaning of
"substantially the same harm" as that phrase is defined in
subsections (a)-(d).64 Of the ten circuits that have considered the
issue, five have held that the counts should not be grouped,
whereas the other five have held that the counts should be
grouped.
65
In the most recent case, United States v. Napoli,6" the Second
Circuit held that money laundering and fraud should not be
grouped under subsection (b) because they do not involve the same
victim.67 The court held that the victim of fraud is the person
defrauded, while the victim of money laundering is society as a
whole." The court's rationale represents the majority view: the
First,69 Eighth, 7 and Tenth" Circuits have all held that money
laundering and fraud involve different victims. Only the Fifth
62. 18 U.S.CA. app. § 3D1.2.
63. Id. § 3D1.2(a)-(d). For the complete text of this section, see supra note 8. It is not clear
whether the court can group counts together only if one of the subsections applies. For
example, in a case where the court may find grouping appropriate even though the counts
do not specifically fall under any of the subsections, the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide
any guidance as to whether such grouping would be appropriate. Nevertheless, this may be
a moot point as there does not appear to be any case law on this issue. See HUTCHISONETAL.,
supra note 31, at 966 (authors' comments).
64. Because money laundering and fraud are two distinct crimes, thereby involving two
distinct acts, subsection (a) is inapplicable. Subsection (a) applies only when the crimes
involve the same act. Thus, the courts properly have not considered this subsection in money
laundering and fraud cases.
65. See supra note 12.
66. 179 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1999).
67. See id. at 7.
68. See id.
69. See United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 570 (1st Cir. 1993).
70. See United States v. O'Kane, 155 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 1998).
71. See United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
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Circuit, in United States v. Leonard,72 has taken a contrary view."
In Leonard, the court held that the defendants' money laundering
activity perpetuated the fraudulent scheme, thereby allowing the
defendants to defraud more victims.7' Thus, the victims of the fraud
were de facto victims of the money laundering.
75
Interpretation of subsection (d) has also proved to be fertile
ground for disagreement. The Second,76 Eighth,77 Ninth,78 and
Tenth79 Circuits have held that grouping is not appropriate under
this subsection because money laundering and fraud involve
different types of harms. As noted in United States v. Hildebrand,
"[firaud sentences are based on the amount of loss to victims,"
while "[mioney laundering sentences are based on the value of the
money laundered."0
The Fourth,8' Seventh, 2 and Eleventh" Circuits have taken a
different view, holding that money laundering and fraud should be
grouped under subsection (d). In United States v. Wilson, the court
held that the offense level for both crimes is measured by the total
amount of harm or loss. 4 The court did not address the apparent
distinction between loss and value, focusing instead on the close
relation between money laundering and fraud under the facts of the
case. 5 The close relation between the two counts was also the basis
for the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Mullens, in
72. 61 F.3d 1181 (5th Cir. 1995).
73. In United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281(7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit discussed
the "same victim" argument without expressly referring to subsection (b). The court held
that, under the facts of the case, the victims of the fraud were also the victims of the money
laundering. See id. at 283-84.
74. See Leonard, 61 F.3d at 1186.
75. See id.
76. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1999).
77. See United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 1998).
78. See United States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1993).
79. See United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562,576 (10th Cir. 1992).
80. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d at 763 (emphasis added); accord Johnson, 971 F.2d at 576. For
a complete discussion of this distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 129-30.
81. See United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 167 (4th Cir. 1997).
82. See United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1996).
83. See United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1995).
84. See Wilson, 98 F.3d at 283.
85. See id. at 282-84.
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which the court called the two counts "integral cogs in continuing
the scheme."8
Subsection (c) has received significantly less attention from the
courts than subsections (b) and (d). In fact, the First Circuit is the
only court to expressly analyze the grouping of money laundering
and fraud counts under this subsection. In United States v.
Lombardi,87 the court held that grouping was not appropriate
because the conduct involved in fraud is not treated as a specific
offense characteristic in the money laundering guideline. 8 As the
court explained, the conduct involved in the fraud (i.e., the acts
plus the intent to deceive) was not equivalent to the specific offense
characteristic (i.e., knowledge of the money's source) in the money
laundering guideline.89
In sum, the cases prove that there is considerable doubt as to the
proper treatment of money laundering and fraud under section
3D1.2. Moreover, it is difficult to derive either black letter law or
precedent from the opinions because they are, as to be expected,
bound to the facts of the underlying cases.9" Thus, section 3D1.2 is
best understood through an analysis free of the restraints of a
factual record.
RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY: THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 3D1.2
Prior to analyzing the text of section 3D1.2, it is helpful to first
understand the policy considerations underlying this section. The
86. Mullens, 65 F.3d at 1564. In this case, the defendant "reinvested" substantial sums
of the fraudulently obtained money back into the Ponzi scheme. See id, The court reasoned
that this reinvestment was essential to continuing the scheme and was thus an "integral
cog." See id.
87. 5 F.3d 568 (1st Cir. 1993).
88. See id. at 571.
89. See id.
90. As an example, consider the Eleventh Circuit's "integral cogs" theory in Mullens, 65
F.3d at 1564. One might wonder what the result would have been had the defendant not
reinvested the proceeds of the fraud back into the fraudulent scheme. If the defendant had
simply laundered the money by investing in stocks or bonds, for example, the court might
have found grouping of the defendant's money laundering and fraud convictions to be
improper. It certainly would be difficult to consider the counts "integral cogs" in such a case
because the laundered funds would not have been used in any way to perpetuate the
fraudulent scheme.
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Commission's primary objective was to "minimize the possibility
that an arbitrary casting of a single transaction into several counts
will produce a longer sentence."9' The Commission believed that
conduct causing multiple harms should not necessarily result in a
proportionate increase in the defendant's sentence, lest the
"simplest offenses.., lead to sentences of life imprisonment."9 2
Conduct that causes multiple harms, however, does warrant a
certain degree of additional punishment. In essence, the
Commission had to balance the competing interests of the offender
and society. Section 3D1.2, in combination with the other "multiple
counts" rules, represents this balance: it "prevent[s] multiple
punishment for substantially identical offense conduct," while
"provid[ing] incremental punishment for significant additional
criminal conduct."3 Thus, the decision of whether to group
particular counts must be understood in light of the policy choices
considered by the Commission when drafting this rule. Policy
considerations alone are, nevertheless, not a substitute for careful
textual analysis of section 3D1.2, to which the discussion now
turns.
94
The guideline provides the analytical framework by expressly
statingthe three circumstances under which money laundering and
fraud can properly be grouped.95 Thus, the analysis logically
proceeds within this framework.
Subsection (b)
In order to group counts pursuant to subsection (b), two general
elements must be met. First, the counts must involve the "same
91. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 1A (West 1996).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 3D (introductory commentary).
94. Of course, when the intended meaning of a.rule is ambiguous on its face, and thus
susceptible to contradictory interpretation, as is the case with section 3D1.2, policy
statements are anecessary source in the quest to resolve the ambiguity. As one commentator
stated, "[blefore the true meaning of a statute can be determined where there is genuine
uncertainty concerningits applications, consideration mustbe given to the problem in society
to which the [Commission] addressed itself." NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 15 (6th ed. 2000).
95. Subsection (a) is inapplicable to the analysis for the reasons previously cited. See
supra note 64.
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victim.""5 Second, the counts must involve "two or more acts or
transactions connected by a common criminal objective or
constituting part of a common scheme or plan."97 As noted above,
the "same victim" requirement has been the subject of considerable
discussion in the appellate courts, with the majority holding that
money laundering and fraud involve different victims." These
decisions are based on the rationale that the victim of fraud is the
person defrauded, while the victim of money laundering is society.
This rationale finds considerable support both in the guideline
itself and in a logical consideration of the crimes involved.
The guideline, naturally, is the starting point. While subsection
(b) does not provide a definition of "victim," the application notes
following the rule provide insight into the Commission's intended
meaning of the word. Specifically, Application Note Two states that
"[Vlictim" is not intended to include indirect or secondary
victims. Generally, there will be one person who is directly and
most seriously affected by the offense and is therefore
identifiable as the victim. For offenses in which there are no
identifiable victims.., the "victim"... is the societal interest
that is harmed.'
Thus, under the guideline, the "victim" is either a person, which
includes corporations and other organizations, or society.'00
While the guideline provides the starting point, it does not
ultimately answer the question of whether an offender who
defrauds individuals and subsequently launders the proceeds of the
fraud is guilty of harming the "same victim." To answer this
96. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2(b).
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
99. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2, Commentary, Application Note 2.
100. From a purely theoretical standpoint, one could argue that society is always the
victim of a criminal act. Certainly, the criminal justice system is founded on the premise that
criminal acts are public wrongs because they offend the peace and are "detrimental to the
welfare of society." JOHN C. KLOTTER, CRmINALLAw 3 (3d ed. 1990). Thus, in one sense, we
are all victims of criminal conduct. Nevertheless, we are at most indirect or secondary
victims and Application Note Two makes clear that "victim" is not intended to refer to
indirect or secondary victims. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2, Commentary, Application Note
2. Thus, societal interests are implicated only in cases in which there is not an actual victim
directly harmed by the conduct.
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question, one must consider the nature of the substantive offenses
involved and, more precisely, who is directly affected by the crime.
In the case of fraud, it is quite obvious that the person most directly
and seriously affected is the person defrauded. Thus, the victim of
fraud is the person defrauded.
The difficulty, of course, is identifying the victim of money
laundering. In United States v. O'Kane, the Eighth Circuit held that
"money laundering harms society's interest in discovering and
deterring criminal conduct, because by laundering the proceeds of
crime, the criminal vests that money with the appearance of
legitimacy," which in turn allows the "criminal unfettered,
unashamed and camouflaged access to the fruits of those ill-gotten
gains."10'The Tenth Circuit, moreover, noted that "Congress aimed
the crime of money laundering at conduct that follows in time the
underlying crime rather than to afford an alternative means of
punishing the prior 'specified unlawful activity.'"1 2 Certainly, it is
logical to treat the two crimes as mutually exclusive. Once
defrauded, the victim has been harmed; what the offender
subsequently does with the money is irrelevant from the fraud
victim's standpoint, except to the extent that the subsequent
activity makes the money more difficult to recover in the form of
restitution. In sum, the victimization is complete when the offender
gains possession of the money.
Nevertheless, there is a somewhat persuasive counterargument
in cases in which the money is reinvested in the fraudulent scheme,
thereby perpetuating further fraudulent activity. There are two
potential scenarios in such cases. One scenario involves an offender
who uses the fraudulently obtained funds to promote and
perpetuate the fraudulent activity, which in turn leads to more
people being defrauded. This scenario essentially follows the facts
of United States v. Leonard.°3 In that case, the court held that
grouping was appropriate because there was a "group of targeted
101. 155 F.3d 969, 972-73 (8th Cir. 1998).
102. United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562,569 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States
v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206,1214 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also Michael Zeldin, Money Laundering
Sentencing Guidelines, in THE SIXTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SEMINAR ON THE FEDERAL
SENTENcING GUIDELINES § 10, at 15 (1997) (noting that Congress intended that money
laundering be punished separately from the underlying crime that gave rise to the proceeds).
103. 61 F.3d 1181 (5th Cir. 1995).
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victims" 1 4 and therefore all the victims of the fraud were also
victims of the money laundering. The court's reasoning, however,
disregards the plain language of Application Note Two, which
states that "there will be one person who is directly and most
seriously affected by the offense and is therefore identifiable as the
victim.""0 5 Certainly, section 3D1.2(b) does not contemplate the
grouping of victims.l"6 Thus, in cases in which the money defrauded
from certain individuals is laundered and subsequently reinvested
in the criminal scheme to defraud another group of individuals, the
victims of the fraud and money laundering are clearly distinct and
separate victims.
Under the second conceivable scenario, the analysis potentially
becomes more difficult. For example, if a person is defrauded and
part of that money is "reinvested" and used to defraud the same
person a second time, one could argue that the individual has been
victimized by both crimes. However, the pivotal question is whether
the money laundering itself harmed the victim of the fraud. The
inescapable conclusion is that it did not. The harm from the second
fraud derives from the fraudulent acts, not the laundered money.'1°
As stated in Application Note Two, ambiguities are to be resolved
by identifying and grouping "counts involving substantially the
same harm.""8 Thus, where the harm is distinct, the counts cannot
be grouped.
The concept of "harm" is also important to an understanding of
the second element of subsection (b). The counts must not only be
part of"a single course of conduct with a single criminal objective,"
but must also "represent essentially one composite harm." 9 As
noted above, fraud causes a personal injury to the individual
defrauded, while money laundering invades societal interests.
Essentially, the "same harm" requirement prevents the overly
broad application of this guideline to substantially different counts
104. Id. at 1186.
105. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2, Commentary, Application Note 2 (emphasis added).
106. See id. § 3DI.2(b).
107. The laundered money is essentially nothing more than a tool used to commit the
second fraud. This would be similar to an individual using a gun stolen during one burglary
to commit a second burglary.
108. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3D1.2.
109. Id., Commentary, Application Note 4.
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that happen to be connected by a single objective and source of
conduct.
The rationale behind this requirement becomes manifestly clear
by considering the following example. A crack addict is in desperate
need of a "fix" but has no money. To obtain the cash necessary to
buy the drugs, the addict robs a convenience store. Immediately
after the robbery, the addict walks outside and purchases crack
from a street dealer. The addict is then arrested, charged, and
convicted of robbery and drug possession. Under the facts of this
example, both the robbery and the drug possession are linked by a
common objective and course of conduct. Grouping would,
nevertheless, be inappropriate because the counts involve different
harms.110
In sum, money laundering and fraud should not be grouped
under subsection (b). While the two crimes may, in many cases, be
part of a single criminal scheme, they cause different harms to
different victims and thus fall outside the scope of subsection (b).
Subsection c)
Subsection (c) permits grouping when "one of the counts
embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic
in... the guideline applicable to another of the counts.""' The
Sentencing Commission provided guidance for when this subsection
should be used by noting that "when conduct that represents a
separate count... is also a specific offense characteristic in or
other adjustment to another count, the count represented by that
conduct is to be grouped with the count to which it constitutes an
110. This also serves to refute the "but for" theory of United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d
1560 (11th Cir. 1995). In Mullens, the court held that "[wlithout the fraud there would have
been no funds to launder." Id. at 1564. This is essentially another way of saying that the
money laundering and fraud are part of a single course of conduct with a single objective.
Applying this theory to the example, one could say that "but for" the robbery, there would
have been no money to buy drugs, and hence no conviction for drug possession. Moreover,
the "but for" theory would effectively subsume the money laundering statute into the
underlying offense that was the source of the funds. There will, of course, never be money
to launder without the commission of an underlying offense to generate the money. Thus, the
"but for" theory sweeps too broadly and must be reined in by adherence to the "same harm"
standard.
111. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2(c).
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aggravating factor."112 The express purpose of this subsection was
to prevent "'double counting' of offense behavior." ll '
As previously noted, the First Circuit, in United States v.
Lombardi,"' is the only federal appellate court to have considered
this issue. In Lombardi, the defendant argued that the conduct
embodied in the fraud counts were the fraudulent acts; the specific
offense characteristic in the money laundering count was
knowledge of the funds' source.'15 By committing the fraudulent
acts, the defendant obviously had knowledge of the funds' source.
Although this was a novel argument, the court properly recognized
the defendant's misreading of subsection (c).n6 The fraudulent acts
(i.e., the "conduct") are not the same thing as knowledge of the
funds' source (i.e., the specific offense characteristic). In essence, "it
is the knowledge of the fraud, not the fraud itself, that enhances
the sentence"11 under the money laundering guideline. Moreover,
subsection (c) applies only when the "offenses are closely related.""'
For the reasons cited above" 9 and below, 2 ° money laundering and
fraud are distinct offenses and therefore are not closely related.
Subsection (c) will likely continue to receive comparatively little
attention in the federal courts. Certainly, the theory employed by
the defendant in Lombardi is limited to a narrow scope of cases:
those cases in which the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. §
1957 for money laundering and the underlying offense do not
involve the "manufacture, importation, or distribution of narcotics
or other controlled substances."' By contrast, subsection (d) has
received substantial attention by the federal courts.
112. Id. § 3D1.2, Application Note 5.
113. Id.
114. 5 F.3d 568 (lst Cir. 1993).
115. See id. at 571.
116. See id.
117. ROGER W. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 530
(1997).
118. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2, Commentary, Application Note 5.
119. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
121. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 2S1.2(b)(1)(A).
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Subsection (d)
The relevant part of subsection (d) states that counts are to be
grouped "[wihen the offense level is determined largely on the basis
of the total amount of harm or loss.., or some other measure of
aggregate harm." 2 At first blush, this would appear to require the
grouping of money laundering and fraud counts. Without question,
subsection (d) provides the strongest foundation for the grouping
argument.' This is true for at least two reasons.
First, the fraud and money laundering guidelines are specifically
listed as guidelines "to be grouped" under subsection (d)." 4 Second,
the offense level for both the fraud and money laundering
guidelines appear to be based on a monetary valuation of the harm
or loss. While initially persuasive, these arguments ultimately are
refuted by closer analysis.
As the courts that have grouped the counts under this subsection
have readily acknowledged, the fact that the fraud and money
laundering guidelines appear on the list of counts to be grouped
does not make grouping automatic.' Rather, it is merely a listing
of counts that may be appropriate for grouping. The overriding
requirement is that the offenses be of the "same general type." 126
Application Note Six explains that the phrase "same general type"
"is to be construed broadly, and would include, for example,
larceny, embezzlement, forgery, and fraud.""27 While it is
instructive to note that money laundering is absent from this list,
this is hardly dispositive of the issue. An examination of the phrase
122. I& app. § 3D1.2(d).
123. But see HUTCHISON FTAL., supra note 31, at 973 (arguing that grouping would be
inappropriate under subsection (d)because moneylaunderingoffenses are not assessedusing
similar tables as are other offenses, and it would therefore be impossible to aggregate the
amount of money involved).
124. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2(d); see also United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281,283 (7th
Cir. 1996) (stating that "[ilt is noteworthy that subsection (d) . . . identifies" money
laundering and fraud as offenses to be grouped); United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560,
1564 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that both money laundering and fraud appear on the list of
counts to be grouped).
125. See Wilson, 98 F.3d at 283 (citing United States v. Harper, 972 F.2d 321,322 (11th
Cir. 1992)).
126. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 3D1.2(d), Commentary, Application Note 6.
127. Id.
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"same general type" in light of the examples supplied by the
Commission is more telling.
A relevant example is the following: a "defendant is convicted of
five counts of mail fraud and ten counts of wire fraud .... All
fifteen counts of fraud are to be grouped together."' In this
example, the counts are clearly of the "same general type" because
they all involve a monetary objective achieved through deceptive
conduct. Similarly, if a defendant was convicted of five counts of
transaction money laundering and five counts of transportation
money laundering, all ten counts presumably should be grouped
together because they are of the "same general type." Moreover, by
merging the examples, one can see how section 3D1.2(d) should
operate in a case involving both fraud and money laundering. For
example, suppose a defendant is convicted of five counts of mail
fraud and five counts of transaction money laundering. The five
counts of fraud should all be grouped as one, while the five counts
of money laundering should all be grouped as one. This is as far as
the grouping process should go, however, leaving the court with two
separate groups to combine under section 3D1.4. Such a conclusion
appears to be the correct interpretation of subsection (d), especially
in light of the fact that money laundering and fraud actually
measure the amount of harm in different ways.
As noted above, proponents of grouping argue that money
laundering and fraud measure harm in similar ways because both
base the offense level on the amount of money involved.
Hildebrand,12 however, recognized an important distinction
between the guidelines for the two crimes. The court noted that
"[firaud sentences are based on the amount of loss to the victims
[while] [mioney laundering sentences are based on the value of the
money laundered."' The difference between loss and value can
best be explained by an example. Consider the following facts: a
defendant is convicted of fraud for misrepresenting the value of a
ring because he claimed it was a diamond ring worth $10,000 when
it was actually a cubic zirconia ring worth $100. The defendant sold
the ring to the victim for $10,000 and immediately laundered the
128. Id.
129. 152 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 1998).
130. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
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sale proceeds by investing in securities. The value of the money
laundered is $10,000, while the loss from the fraud is only $9,900
because the victim received $100 worth of property. In other words,
the loss represents the amount the ring was overvalued. Thus,
while the offense levels for both the money laundering and fraud
guidelines are based on a monetary amount, the two guidelines
measure that amount in distinctly different ways.
In the final analysis, money laundering and fraud are distinct
crimes that simply do not fit under the grouping rules of section
3D1.2. It is time to establish a per se rule that mandates that
money laundering and fraud never be grouped together for
sentencing purposes.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PER SE RULE
In establishing such a rigid rule as the one proposed here, a
necessary first step is to define precisely the scope of the rule. The
rule, quite simply, would mandate that fraud counts be treated
separately from money laundering counts under all facts and
circumstances.'31 The rule would be directed only to the grouping
decision itself and, thus, would have no effect on either the
application of the fraud guideline to the fraud count or the
application of the money laundering guideline to the money
laundering count."3 2 Courts would applythe rule as a matter of law,
thereby obviating the need for a fact-specific inquiry.
There are at least three compelling justifications for establishing
this rule. First, the current circuit split would be resolved by such
a rule. While circuit splits are, of course, quite common, there
131. One could argue that the rule proposed in this Note is nothing more than piecemeal
reform that does not address the many other interpretive problems that have arisen under
the Guidelines. See STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 52, at 92-93 (listing a number of
interpretive difficulties with various sections of the Guidelines). This is certainly a valid
criticism for those who believe that the Guidelines require comprehensive reform. See, e.g.,
id at 143-77. Short of such a complete overhaul, however, the proposed rule effectively
resolves one serious issue that currently plagues the federal judiciary. The proposed rule,
moreover, is precisely the kind of reform that is needed: it is clear, precise, and easily
applied. Indeed, offense-specific amendments may be even more effective than
comprehensive reform because such reform would likely require redrafting, which would
undoubtedly lead to a whole new set of disputes concerning interpretation.
132. The counts would, of course, still be combined under section 3D1.2. See supra note
24 and accompanying text.
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comes a point at which resolution is required. In the case of section
3D1.2, the time has arrived. As previously noted, of the thirteen
federal circuits, ten have considered the issue.13 Unable to find
common ground, the courts have split evenly, with five circuits
holding that the counts ought to be grouped, and five holding that
they should not be grouped.'3 ' Such a result clearly is not consistent
with the role of the federal judiciary. Indeed, the federal laws are
national laws and are intended to be applied equally throughout
the country. When it becomes apparent that this goal is not being
achieved, as is the case here, intervention is necessary.
The second reason necessitating the establishment of a per se
rule is the prevention of judicial waste and inefficiency. Consider
the facts of the cases decided by the appeals courts. In many cases,
the government does not want the money laundering and fraud
counts to be grouped because nongrouping will produce a longer
sentence; 35 in other cases, the government does want the counts to
be grouped because this will produce a longer sentence.3 6 The
reverse, of course, is true from the defendant's perspective:
grouping is desirable when it produces a shorter sentence, but is
undesirable when it produces a longer sentence. The absurdity is
that a federal prosecutor may argue for grouping in one case, but
return to the same court the next day and argue against grouping
in another case."3 7 The litigation necessary to resolve this issue in
individual cases requires the expenditure of valuable resources in
an already overburdened judicial system.
Finally, a per se rule is necessary to carry out the express policy
objectives of the Sentencing Reform Act, namely, uniformity and
133. See supra note 12.
134. See id.
135. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. O'Kane, 155
F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kunzman,
54 F.3d 1522, 1531 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 570 (1st Cir.
1993); United States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298,299 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Johnson,
971 F.2d 562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992).
136. See United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756,762-63 (8th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163,166-67 (4th Cir. 1997); UnitedStates v. Leonard, 61F.3d 1181, 1185
(5th Cir. 1995).
137. At least one court has expressed its dissatisfaction with such conduct. See Leonard,
61 F.3d at 1186 n.5 (noting that the government had only "technically" avoided inconsistency
in its arguments before the court).
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proportionality in sentencing. An ad hoc approach to the
Sentencing Guidelines effectively returns the federal judiciary to
the pre-Guidelines system of inconsistency and inequity. Even if
one were to accept the proposition that individuals who commit the
same crimes ought to be sentenced differently because of other
factors, such as socioeconomic status,3 8 sentencing should not
depend solely on the jurisdiction in which the criminal was
sentenced. A violation of the federal fraud and money laundering
statutes is neither more nor less of a crime whether it is committed
in the Second Circuit or the Fourth Circuit. Nevertheless, this is
the current state of affairs. Depending upon the jurisdiction, an
individual may receive a sentence that is disproportionately harsh
or disproportionately lenient. 1 9 Without implementation of the per
se rule, the federal judiciary will continue to impose sentences that
are not uniform throughout the system.
CONCLUSION
In the American criminal justice system, there are two general
parts to every criminal trial in which a defendant is found
guilty-the culpability phase, in which guilt or innocence is
decided, and the sentencing phase, in which an appropriate
punishment is determined. The importance of the second phase, the
sentencing decision, cannot be overstated. Indeed, while a
conviction has several important consequences (i.e., public
stigmatization), its chief consequence is that it enables the court to
impose punishment on the defendant.
138. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 7, at 15 (suggesting that socioeconomic status justifies
disparate sentences).
139. It should also be noted that the per se rule is neither "pro-defendant" nor "anti-
defendant,"and is therefore not susceptible to the criticism that the Guidelines have made
sentences harsher across the board. See id. at 72. In some cases, the defendant will receive
a longer sentence by not grouping the two counts, while in other cases he will receive a
shorter sentence. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
It is important to emphasize why sentences will differ when the counts are not grouped,
lest the per se rule be attacked for destroying the very proportionality and uniformity that
it purports to uphold. Specifically, sentences will differ because of differences in the
substantive nature of the defendants' crimes rather than because of inequitable application
of the Guidelines. This point is most easily understood by referring back to the example cited
in the Napoli case. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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Prior to 1987, a defendant in federal court was at the mercy of
the judge who happened to be assigned to the case. There was little
structure or guidance to the sentencing decision and, thus, there
was little to rein in the judge's discretion.140 The result was that,
within the same federal courthouse, in courtrooms separated only
by a common wall, two defendants convicted of similar crimes could
be sentenced to starkly different punishments. Some punishments
were too harsh, while others were too lenient.
The judges could hardly be blamed for such unjust results.
Judges, like all people, have certain preexisting beliefs and
prejudices that are shaped by a lifetime of experiences. Consciously
or subconsciously, these beliefs inevitably influenced their
sentencing decisions. Thus, it is hardly surprising that sentences
varied so drastically from one courtroom to the next.
The implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines was intended
to bring uniformity to the system. With a single set of guidelines for
the entire federal judiciary, the days of disparate, disproportionate
sentences should have been relegated to the status of a historical
footnote. Indeed, "[tihe whole point of the guidelines was to hem in
district courts with a set of rules created by the Commission and
enforced by the courts of appeals."' Unfortunately, while
sentences as a whole have become more uniform and proportional,
the misapplication of section 3D1.2 to fraud and money laundering
convictions demonstrates that inequity still exists. The time has
arrived for the Sentencing Commission, through an amendment to
the Guidelines, or for the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve this
issue.4 ' Implementing the per se rule proposed in this Note would
140. See Skrivseth, supra note 33, at 284-94.
141. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 52, at 78 (quoting Frank 0. Bowman).
142. Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344
(1991), the likelihood is that the Sentencing Commission will have to resolve the issue. The
Court expressed its opinion that the Commission should have the primary responsibility of
resolving conflicts among the circuit courts with respect to the statutory interpretation of the
Guidelines, and, therefore, the Court should exercise restraint in granting certiorari in such
cases. See id. at 348.
Interestingly, the Commission did make one attempt to resolve this issue. In 1995, the
Commission submitted to Congress an amendment thatwould have revised substantially the
money laundering guideline. Part of the recommended revision grouped money laundering
with the offenses from which the laundered money was derived. See HUTCHISON ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 973. Congress, however, rejected the amendment because it would have
allowed money laundering to be grouped with drug offenses. See Pub. L. No. 104-38,109 Stat.
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best serve the policy objectives of the Guidelines and would
definitively resolve an issue that has split nearly the entire federal
judiciary.
Eric C. Tew
334 (1995). The rejection of the amendment appears to signal that Congress would prefer
that money launderingnot be grouped with the underlying offense. Thus, while it is difficult
to predict how Congress would vote on a hypothetical amendment, there appears to be a
reasonably strong likelihood that the per se nongrouping rule would receive Congressional
approval.
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